The Chronicle Herald (Metro) Thu, 31 Oct 2024 My recent article regarding domestic ferry safety:
READER’S CORNER
FERRY OPERATORS, REGULATORS CARRY LARGE RESPONSIBILITIES
The Chronicle Herald (Metro)31 Oct 2024 John W. Dalziel, Halifax
On Jan. 31, 1953, the passenger-car ferry Princess Victoria sailed from Stranraer, Scotland on its short daily channel crossing to Larne in Northern Ireland.
The ship had been on this service since being built seven years previously, and the captain was experienced.
However, of the 177 persons onboard, only 44 were to survive the day; 133 died, including all the women and children onboard.
A wave smashed in the stern door to the car deck and, after flooding, the Princess Victoria sank.
The formal investigation into the tragedy put the blame almost entirely on the ship’s owners, the British Transport Commission. The ship was known to have a fatal flaw. The inadequate strength of the stern door to the car deck, which, coupled with insufficient drainage from the car deck, doomed the Princess Victoria and 133 of the people onboard.
The stern door was a major factor in a similar incident that took place off Cape Breton in 1970, when the Patrick Morris was lost while trying to rescue some fishermen. The train deck was flooded, the ship rapidly capsized and four crew members lost their lives.
In most cases, car ferries flood through the bow door. In 1987, the large ferry Herald of Free Enterprise sailed from Zeebrugge, Belgium, bound across the English Channel for Dover. However, the bow door had been left open; in a matter of minutes, the ship capsized and 193 died. Fortunately, the ship had capsized onto a sand bank, otherwise the death toll would have been much higher.
Seven years later, in 1994, the large ferry Estonia sank in the Baltic after the bow visor and door were torn off: 852 died, 137 survived.
In all the cases, a catastrophic, rapid capsize resulted after flooding of the car deck; this phenomenon is well understood by naval architects and marine regulatory organizations. Loss of life resulted from shortcomings in a ship’s design or operation. The operators and marine regulatory organizations received considerable public criticism afterward.
This could be relevant to a proposal to sail the MV Confederation with a bow visor missing, and the approval process for this proposal by Canadian regulatory authorities.
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