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Thursday 6th February 2025 Weymouth Dorset UK - Institution of Engineering & Technology (IET) Dorset and South Wilts Network Lecture Maritime autonomous systems - the future of mine countermeasures. Presented by Sarah Brown (Product Lead, Atlas Elektronik UK). Naval mines have been deployed for centuries as a cheap and effective way to deny free movement of shipping. Easy to lay, but much harder to counter, the removal of mines and the threat that they pose has been a challenge for navies who rely on access to the sea to deliver military tasks. The field of mine countermeasures (MCM) has traditionally been undertaken by specialist ships entering minefields or by divers deployed to targets to dispose of them. Recent developments in autonomous technology have changed the way that MCM can be delivered, reducing risk to personnel and increasing the speed at which minefields can be cleared. This talk will present the journey from traditional methods to new technologies and discuss the challenges in getting from scientific theory to a product that navies can use. 18:30 Tea, 19:00 Lecture starts, 20:00 Q&A 20:30 Close. Weymouth College, Fleet Building, Cranford Avenue, Weymouth, Dorset, DT47LQ. Contact Andrew Criswick. Tel: 01305 212926, mob: 07867 843475 Email: andrew.criswick@uk.atlas-elektronik.com Picture credit Atlas Elektronik

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US Navy Seeks to Streamline Shipbuilding After Witnessing Ally's Efficiency Navy Secretary Impressed by South Korea and Japan's Speed and Cost-Effectiveness. A recent Business Insider article revealed Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro's admiration for South Korea's shipbuilding capabilities. Struggling with delays in major programs, Del Toro praised South Korea and Japan for their ability to construct high-quality warships on schedule and within budget. He further challenged American shipbuilders in a Forbes article, demanding timely and budget-conscious delivery "without excuses." This begs the question: how can the US Navy expedite warship production? The answer might lie in adopting a "startup mentality." Ditching excessive bureaucracy and fostering smaller, independent teams could be the key. By empowering autonomous teams, the Navy can unlock faster innovation, increased learning agility, and a culture of ownership. This translates to quicker adaptation to evolving challenges, ensuring the US remains ahead of the curve. Crucially, embracing a culture of "failing intelligently" will allow these teams to learn from setbacks and continuously improve A startup-inspired approach focuses on dismantling layers of red tape and empowering smaller, autonomous teams. This shift promises to revolutionize large-scale projects like warship construction, leading to significant improvements in speed, cost-effectiveness, and overall project intelligence. ▶Links in the comments! Insights and reflections welcome! Interested in growing and transforming your team with AI when it comes to project delivery? Follow me Duro Kolar, PhD for regular updates! #projectdelivery #innovation #startup #usnavy #shipbuilding #projects #failure #productivefailure #intelligentfailure #team #growth #transformation #ai #artificialintelligence

US shipyards face several major challenges and contribute 0% of global commercial shipbuilding in 2023 while China contributed 53%! Here are the key issues facing US shipyards: ## Workforce Issues - Shortage of skilled workers and difficulty attracting/retaining talent[1][4] - Aging workforce with experienced veterans retiring[1] - Need for accelerated training programs to develop skilled workers more quickly[1] ## Capacity Constraints - Insufficient dry dock capacity to meet maintenance needs of the current and future fleet[3][4] - Inability to accommodate projected maintenance availability between 2019-2040[3] ## Aging Infrastructure - Facilities and equipment at Navy shipyards are old, poorly configured, and in poor condition[3] - Average condition rating of production shop facilities is considered poor[3] ## Technological Challenges - Outdated technology and procurement systems[4] - Difficulty innovating and adopting new technologies like unmanned systems[4] ## Workload and Complexity - Increasing workload and complexity of maintaining modern naval vessels[1] - Challenges in planning for future workforce resource needs[1][2] ## Competition with China - Inability to match China's naval shipbuilding capacity[4] - Need to modernize to remain competitive in great power competition[3][4] Addressing these challenges will require significant investment, strategic planning, and modernization efforts across US shipyards. Citations: [1] Current and Future Challenges to Resourcing U.S. Navy Public ... https://lnkd.in/g_F-ieCk [2] Current and Future Challenges to Resourcing U.S. Navy Public ... https://lnkd.in/gj8ZRgs2 [3] U.S. Navy Shipyards Desperately Need Revitalization and a Rethink https://lnkd.in/g3X6NrQs [4] US Navy shipbuilding spree could do more harm than good https://lnkd.in/gQM-82rv [5] A Strategic Assessment of the Future of U.S. Navy Ship Maintenance https://lnkd.in/gpWUrZiQ

Bonne question en effet...

Corée du Nord, encore. Ça commence à devenir un marronnier, mais... pas de ma faute... il se trouve qu'il s'y passe énormément de choses en ce moment. . Alliance avec la Russie, visite du ministre russe de la Défense... Mais aussi récemment, une visite du cher leader rondouillard Kim au complexe naval de Tapchon. L'analyse d'images satellite par les (vrais !) experts de 38 North pointe des développements d'infrastructures, alors que la base avait déjà fait l'objet de constructions importantes après une visite de Kim en 2015, sans que cela ne conduise à une activité accrue. Mais les analystes concluent maintenant à une reprise et une accélération de la modernisation du complexe, peut-être en vue d'en refaire une base navale majeure. . Cela pourrait être une indication d'un domaine de coopération russo-coréenne encore sous le radar international. Car pour que cette grande base navale soit utile, il y faudra des navires ; peut-être des sous-marins ; ainsi que tout un tas de systèmes annexes, du radar aux batteries de défense aérienne, par exemple. Et pour toutes ces choses, la Russie peut être d'une grande aide à la RDPC, sans aucun doute. https://lnkd.in/dkRnXiKB

Quality is maintained through quantity: quantity of time, quantity of opportunities to work & train in that time, quantity of ships & Sailors to make good on those opportunities. And this rule applies from the individual sailor to the entirety of the civilian shipbuilding profession. China, with the worlds largest fleet and a world of enemies to spar with in their own backyard, has so much more time, opportunity, and resource to cultivate quality – should they choose to. With the shipbuilding capacity 232x that of America - That’s 232 times the opportunity to build uniquely qualified and insightful engineers and shipwrights - should they choose to. Right now, our greatest advantage is the fact our enemy voluntarily chooses not to pursue the kind of autonomous professional excellence our Navies & maritime industries have historically relied upon. But maybe they’ll achieve a sufficient shadow of it. Without capacity – we will not have that same opportunity to choose excellence. That comparative excellence is - now - our one shining advantage. Without it, we will lose. And that is an unacceptable result. #Navy #Shipbuilding #maritimesecurity #maritimeindustry #training #manpower #china #defenseindustry #humancapital #southchinasea

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I can't say this just-published CRS assessment on "Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans," has me in a confident frame of mind regarding our ability to deter an increasingly reckless, expansionist and bellicose China in the coming years. I suppose we and our allies/partners might still apply a broad range of instruments of power to contain China's hegemonic and revanchist aspirations, and we might yet succeed, but it's not likely to be U.S. maritime superiority that tips the balance. No matter how you dissect the issues, if you are a realist, the math doesn't work out favorably. As they say, "It's probably going to get quite a bit worse, before it might get better." In and through the "Davidson Window" (Admiral Davidson's 2021 Congressional testimony) - our Navy likely gets smaller and less capable by a significant degree. Beyond that, is anybody's guess - notwithstanding a lot of the best-case prognostications in this report. Counting on best-case in these times does not a strategy make. Simply commissioning "deep dive" studies and assessments, to admire the problems even further, and sound the alarm bells even louder, does not a strategy make. At some point quite soon, as a nation we need to return to our Mahanian roots, dramatically expand our shipbuilding capacity, and start bending metal at substantially larger scales and accelerated rates. In parallel, the workforce and sustainment/maintenance capacities need to be resolutely addressed and fully synchronized. The range of enabling and implementing factors that must be nearly perfectly resourced and executed in the coming years, such that the USN could achieve something approaching a 381 combatant ship capacity, plus a postulated total of about 130 or so "other" types of platforms — unmanned mostly - is daunting. This analysis suggests a range of things that have to go nearly perfectly, and we might then get there by 2042. But, again, just about every other massive challenge addressed in this report, as well as highly problematic and unpredictable factors that live between the lines, would have to be resolutely and permanently overcome, to achieve those numbers. Based on my reading of the issues presented, and my 40-years close-in observations of the nature of our Navy culture, our self-inflicted politics simply internal to the DoN (not even considering our national politics which now routinely vacillate between ridiculous extremes), the deeply-ingrained bureaucratic tendencies of our organizations and our governance constructs, and factors associated with our workforce/talent management practices, our budget management processes, and, at the national level, our chaotic approach to national security policy and establishing and sustaining national priorities, I think it's likely that we'll still be hovering around 300 combatant ships, or less, for quite some time, and probably out to the 2040s. This coming week, vote the Mahanian ticket!! Oh wait, that's not a thing.