On Tuesday, the House Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security held a hearing entitled “Building the Fleet: Assessing the Department of Homeland Security’s Role in the United States Coast Guard’s Acquisitions Process.” Things aren't going well. Five years after contract award, the functional design for the U.S Coast Guard's Polar Security Cutter (PSC) is only 67% complete. Originally, the lead ship was to be delivered in March of 2024.
Although the experts called before the subcommittee pulled no punches in their criticism of the Polar Security Cutter program, the DHS and Coast Guard representatives did not respond to these criticisms directly, but instead focused their blame the original prime contractor and the general state of the U.S. Industrial Base- not a failure to mitigate risk.
However, everyone knew that building the first heavy polar icebreaker in fifty years was going to be difficult and risky. It seems to me that the U.S. Coast Guard missed several opportunities to mitigate that risk, resulting in the current projected five-year delay in delivery and a cost nearly twice that of what was originally projected. A revised schedule is due later this year.
In a move that seems unexplainable, the USCG awarded the PSC design and construction contract to the only one (of three bids) backed by a team with no experience in icebreakers. This seems like a case of picking the lowest bidder that technically met the requirement and hoping that things go well.
The USCG needs icebreakers- eight or nine of which 4 or five will be PSCs. In order to prevent similar problems in the next class- the so-called Arctic Security Cutters- the USCG needs to seriously consider why and how it failed to mitigate risk in the PSC program and make changes to avoid a similar outcome.
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